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alize that their statements in courts should be carefully considered
beforehand so as to avoid the result reached in the principal case.
Attorneys, as agents for their clients, should make out the best case
possible for the client and force the adversary to prove every part
of his case rather than allow the verdict to be based on an improvident admission.
J. L. R.

FU

p

INTmsTs-LUIMTATIONS To HEms PosTroNEm-DIErm-

TAmm.-In 1909 T died devising certain real estate to
his son A and As wife, B, for and during the life of the survivor of
them, remainder to their children. The will further provided that if
A and B died without having had any children, then the real estate
was to be divided among T's heirs. In 1910 A died childless. The
property was subsequently sold by agreement between the life tenant, B, and T's heirs. A disagreement arose among the heirs as to
the proper distribution of the proceeds. P contended that the heirs
of T, who were to share the proceeds of the sale, were to be determined upon the death of the life tenant, B, and since that class is
still contingent as to membership it would be impossible to distribute
the proceeds. D contended that the heirs of T should be determined
at the death of T or no later than the death of A when it became
conclusive that he would have no children. The lower court accepted D's latter contention. Held, that as a general rule when a
testator directs that upon the happening of a certain event a particular interest or estate is to go to his heirs, the class is to be determined as of the date of testator's death unless a contrary intent is
plainly manifested in his will. While the court intimated that the
case fell within the general rule, they further stated that when it
conclusively appeared, by the death of A, that the contingent remainder in his unborn children would never vest, the heirs must be
determined no later than that date. Dean v. Lancaster, 105 S.E.2d
675 (S.C. 1958).
MINATION OF

In order to properly analyze the principal case it becomes
necessary to determine the particular estates in land created so one
may apply the particular rules of law applicable. Upon the death
of the testator the son and his wife had a vested life estate in possession. This is evidenced by the fact that the estate was created in
favor of known, ascertained persons with no condition precedent to
their taking the life estate.
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The limitation in remainder to the children of the life tenants
was a contingent remainder. Rinks v. Gordon, 160 Tenn. 345, 24
S.W. 2d 896 (1930). A remainder is contingent when it is limited
to a person not in being when such limitation is made. Kohl v.
Montgomery, 373 II. 200, 25 N.E.2d 826 (1940). It is interesting to
note that in the principal case the language creating the remainder
does not establish its status as a contingent remainder, in that the
language neither discloses a condition precedent to the vesting of
the estate in the form of an uncertain event, nor does it indicate that
the class to take is unborn or unascertained. The facts of the case
create the contingency, in that the life tenants had no children at the
creation of the estate. Had there been a child born to the life tenants the remainder would have become vested in that child, subject,
however, to being partially divested (or subject to open) to allow
for after born children. Stearns v. Curry, 806 Ill. 94, 137 N.E. 491
(1922).
The limitation over to the heirs of the testator was likewise a
contingent remainder, thus making the limitations following the
life estate a contingent remainder in double aspect. A contingent
remainder in double aspect is the creation of two or more alternative
contingencies or substitutional remainders, whereby two or more
remainders in fee simple are created as substitutes or alternatives,
on such contingencies that only one of the remainders can possibly
vest. Willis v. Lapsley, 240 Ky. 829, 48 S.W.2d 47 (1931). The
contingent remainder in double aspect is to be distinguished from
the vested remainder subject to a condition subsequent with a limitation over in the form of an executory devise which is a devise to
a person in derogation of, or substitution for, a preceding vested
estate in fee simple (defeasible), either in possession, remainder, or
reversion. Humphreys v. Welling, 341 Mo. 1198, 111 S.W.2d 123
(1937).
The remainder to T's heirs, as will later be pointed out, was not
contingent as to class according to the better view, but rather because the vesting of the estate was conditional on the happening of
an uncertain event, i.e., the death of the life tenant without issue.
It is interesting to note that at common law a remainder could
not be created in the heirs of the testator or grantor. This was the
rule known as the doctrine of worthier title which contains two aspects: (1) the inter vivos phase and (2) the testamentary phase.
The inter vivos phase made the remainder in the heirs of the grantor
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void giving the grantor a reversion after the termination of the preceding estate. This phase of the rule is recognized in a few jurisdictions in the United States but the majority of the courts that recognize it deem it only a rule of construction and not a rule of law.
National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E.2d 113
(1944); Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co., 250 N.Y. 298, 165 N.E.
454 (1929); Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919).
In the testamentary phase, the title to the remainder in the testator's
heirs passed to the heirs by descent, rather than devise, as title acquired by descent was deemed to be the "worthier title." This phase
of the rule is almost gone today and would normally have no prac-

tical effect. 3

REsTATEMENT,

PRoPErTY, § 814 (2) (1940).

Quaere,

if such a rule was applied in the principal case, would the court not
be compelled to hold that heirs meant heirs at T's death as that is
when title descends?
The primary problem to be resolved is whether the limitation to
T's heirs includes the class as determined at T's death or at the time
of the death of the life tenant when it was finally positively determined that the remainder in the life tenant's unborn children would
never vest; thereby conclusively establishing the fact that the heirs
of T would. take. The court in the principal case avoided this issue
by stating that while they believed the heirs living at Ts death were
the proper class to take, in no case would the class be determined
any later than the death of the life tenant. In the principal case it
would have made no difference since in either event the class to take
was the same. But suppose, between the time of the death of T and
the death of the life tenant, one or more of Ts heirs had died. This
would have materially affected the distribution of the estate. Professor Simes states: "In the absence of language or circumstances
indicating a contrary intent, the word 'heirs', in a gift to the heirs
of a named person, means those persons who would take the kind
of property which is the subject matter of the gift, on the death of
the named ancestor intestate, according to the local statutes of descent and distribution then in force." SviEs, FUTURE INTmwasrs 321
(1951). This rule is true even though the gift to the heirs is postponed, unless a contrary intent is manifested. Loring v. Sargent, 319
Mass. 127, 64 N.E.2d 446 (1946). Where the gift to heirs is postponed, there is no condition precedent that the persons to take must
survive the period of distribution in the absence of language and
circumstances indicating a contrary intent. Tyler v. City Bank
FarmersTrust Co., 314 Ill. 528, 50 N.E.2d 778 (1943).
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Another view in respect to the determination of the heirs or next
of kin when there is a postponed gift, in remainder or as a substitute
gift, is that the class is to be determined as of the death of the life
tenant though this can not be truly said to be a gift to the heirs of
one who died other than at the death of the life tenant. New York
Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 237 N.Y. 93, 142 N.E. 431, 31
A.L.R. 791 (1923). This view was apparently followed in National
Bank v. Kenney, 113 W. Va. 890, 170 S.E. 177 (1933). However,
in the Kenney case, there was an express condition of survivorship
as to the primary class gift and the court stated that this condition
of survivorship applied equally as well to the substitutional class
gift in favor of the testatrix's heirs, thus holding that only the heirs
who survive the life tenant should take.
The principal case has suggested by inference at Icast a third
possible view, i.e., the heirs who will take are determhic when it
conclusively appears that the heirs will take regardless of the fact
that this happened neither at the testators death nor at the termination of the final life estate (the time of distribution) but in the
interim.
It is submitted that while the decision in the principal case was
satisfactory from a practical point of view, yet the court should have
taken a more positive position in order to establish a precedent for
situations in the nature of the one above suggested, so that one may
more clearly and with preciseness predict what the law will be.
G. H. A.

Punic UTmrs-DscoNTIrNmcE

OF

SEavCE.-P filed a peti-

tion with the Public Service Commission praying authority to discontinue the furnishing of passenger service over its branch line
between Elkins and Durbin, West Virginia. The commission entered
an order granting in part the relief prayed for, but ordered that P
continue furnishing passenger service three days per week. Held,
that, where no public need for such service exists and a substantial
loss is suffered by the carrier in the furnishing of such service,
authority to discontinue the service should be granted. Western
Maryland Ry. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 106 S.E.2d 923 (W. Va.
1959).
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